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Abstract—It is known that the capacity of the intelligent
reflecting surface (IRS) aided cellular network can be effectively
improved by reflecting the incident signals from the transmitter
in a low-cost passive reflecting way. In this paper, we study
the adoption of an IRS for downlink multi-user communication
from a multi-antenna base station (BS). Nevertheless, in the
actual network operation, the IRS operator can be selfish or
have its own objectives due to competing/limited resources as
well as deployment/maintenance cost. Therefore, in this paper,
we develop a Stackelbeg game model to analyze the interaction
between the BS and the IRS operator. Specifically, different from
the existing studies on IRS that merely focus on tuning the
reflection coefficient of all the reflection elements, we consider the
reflection resource (elements) management, which can be realized
via trigger module selection under our proposed IRS architec-
ture that all the reflection elements are partially controlled by
independent switches of controller. A Stackelberg game-based
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is proposed
to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming at the BS and
the passive beamforming of the triggered reflection modules.
Numerical examples are presented to verify the proposed studies.
It is shown that the proposed scheme is effective in the utilities
of both the BS and IRS.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS), transmit
beamforming, passive beamforming, Stackelberg game, alternat-
ing direction method of multipliers (ADMM).
I. INTRODUCTION
By enabling the intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) to the
wireless systems, the IRS-aided wireless system recently has
attracted significant interest due to its potential to further
improve the system capacity and spectral efficiency [1]–
[4]. Specifically, IRS exploits large reflection elements to
proactively steer the incident radio-frequency wave towards
destination terminals [5], which is a promising solution to
build a programmable wireless environment for 6G systems
[6], [7]. Thereby, the fine-grained three-dimensional reflecting
beamforming can be achieved without the need of any transmit
radio frequency (RF) chain [8].
A. Related Work
The IRS-aided wireless systems refer to the scenario that
a large number of software-controlled reflection elements
with adjustable phase shifts for reflecting the incident signal.
As such, the phase shifts of all reflection elements can be
tuned adaptively according to the state of networks, e.g.,
the channel conditions and the incident angle of the signal
by the base station (BS). It is commonly believed that the
propagation environment can be improved without incurring
additional noise at the reflector elements. Currently, major
communication field researchers are actively involved in the
research of IRS-aided communications [9]–[14]. For example,
[14] summarized the main communication applications and
competitive advantages of the IRS technology. In the spirit of
these works, a vast corpus of literature focused on optimizing
active-passive beamforming for unilateral spectral efficiency
maximization subject to power constraint. For instance, [11]
proposed a fractional programming based alternating opti-
mization approach to maximize the weighted SE in IRS-
aided MISO downlink communication systems. In particular,
three assumptions for the feasible set of reflection coefficient
were consider at IRS, including the ideal reflection coefficient
constrained by peak-power, continuous phase shifter, and
discrete phase shifter. Meantime, in MISO wireless systems,
the problem of minimizing the total transmit power at the
access point was considered to energy-efficient active-passive
beamforming [1], [10]. [1] formulated and solved the total
transmit power minimization problem by joint active-passive
beamforming design, subject to the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) constraints, where each reflection element
is a continuous phase shifter. Along this direction, considering
the discrete reflect phase shifts at the IRS, the same optimiza-
tion problem was further studied in [10]. Notably, the afore-
mentioned studies for IRS-aided communications were based
on the premise of ignoring the power consumption at IRS.
In contrast, in [2], an energy efficiency (EE) maximization
problem was investigated by developing a realistic IRS power
consumption model, where IRS power consumption relies on
the type and the resolution of meta-element.
B. Motivation and Contributions
The above resource allocation works address the joint
transmit beamforming and phase shift optimization problem in
IRS-aided communication systems. These works assume that
IRS operators are all selfless, and will always participate in the
cooperative transmission despite their own energy consump-
tion/maintanence cost [2] and profits. However, this assump-
tion becomes unrealistic in practice, due to the advances in in-
telligent communication and the shrinking resources. In other
words, if an IRS operator cannot benefit from the participation,
it will not join in the cooperative communication. Moreover,
the common assumption in the existing studies for IRS-aided
communications is that all the reflection elements are used to
reflect the incident signal, i.e., adjusting reflecting coefficient
of each meta-element simultaneously each time. However,
along with the use of a large number of high-resolution
reflection elements, especially with continuous phase shifters,
triggering all the reflection elements every time may result
in significant power consumption. Moreover, the hardware
support for the IRS implementation is the use of a large
number of tunable metasurfaces. Specifically, the tunability
feature can be realized by introducing mixed-signal integrated
circuits (ICs) or diodes/varactors, which can vary both the
resistance and reactance, offering complete local control over
the complex surface impedance [4], [15]–[17]. According to
the IRS power consumption model presented in [2] and the
hardware support, triggering the entire IRS not only incurs
increased power consumption, but also entails the increased
latency of adjusting phase-shift and accelerates equipment
depreciation. Therefore, realizing reflection resource manage-
ment is significantly important for IRS-aided communications.
In this paper, for IRS-aided multiuser multiple-input single-
output (MISO) systems, we consider the resource allocation
problem in which an IRS operator serves the BS and prices
the triggered reflection module. The problem is formulated as
a Stackelberg game, in which the IRS operator decides the
price for the trigger reflection modules.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• For the first time, a modular architecture of IRS is pro-
posed that divides all the reflection elements into multiple
modules which can be independently controlled by paral-
lel switches. In order to avoid signal loss due to excessive
scattering, we assume that each module contains multiple
reflection elements, i.e., the size of each module is larger
than the incident signal wavelength, since the unit meta-
element size is subwavelength [15]. As mentioned in [7],
the IRS is programmatically controlled by the controller,
and hence, from an operational standpoint, independent
module triggering can be implemented easily. Therefore,
the proposed architecture of IRS allows the realization of
the reflection resource management, since each module
is independently controlled by its switch.
• Based on the proposed modular architecture of IRS, this
paper proposes a new price-based resource allocation
scheme for both the BS and IRS. Furthermore, the Stack-
elberg game is formulated to maximize the individual
revenue of the BS and IRS for the proposed price-based
resource allocation. Since the entire game is a non-
convex mixed-integer problem, which is even hard to
solve in a centralized way, the problem is transformed
into a convex problem by introducing the mixed row
block ℓ1,2-norm [18], which yields a suitable semidefinite
relaxation. To solve this problem, we apply a Stackelberg
game-based alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMM) to identify the price, trigger module subsets,
and subsequently both the transmit power allocation and
the corresponding passive beamforming.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model and formulate the Stackelberg
game problem. Section III investigates the Stackelberg game-
based ADMM algorithm, the optimal price and active-passive
beamforming. Simulation results are provided in Section IV.
In Section V, we draw our main conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Signal Model
Consider the downlink communication between a BS
equipped with M antennas and K single-antenna mobile
users. The communication takes place via an IRS with S
reflection modules, and each module consisting N reflection
elements, and thus, the total reflection elements of IRS is
SN. Define K := {1, 2, . . . ,K}, S := {1, 2, . . . , S}, and
I = {1, 2, . . . , (SN)} as the index sets of users, the reflec-
tion modules, and the reflection elements, respectively. Let
H0,s ∈ CN×M be the channel matrix from the BS to the
sth reflection module of IRS, gs,k ∈ CN×1 be the channel
vector from the sth reflection module of the IRS to user
k. The direct channel for the BS to user k is denoted as
hd,k ∈ CM×1. Denote by φi, ∀i ∈ I the ith reflection element
of the IRS. Let Φ = diag{Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,ΦS} ∈ C(SN)×(SN),
where Φs = diag[φ(s−1)N+1, φ(s−1)N+2, . . . , φsN ] ∈ CN×N .
Define φ = [(φ1)
T , (φ2)
T , . . . , (φS)
T ]T ∈ C(SN)×1, where
φs = [(φ(s−1)N+1)
†, (φ(s−1)N+2)
†, . . . , (φsN )
†]T ∈ CN×1.
We assume that all the reflection modules of IRS can
potentially join the cooperative communication, then, the
channel matrix from the BS to the IRS and the IRS to user k
respectively are
H =
[
(H0,1)
T
, (H0,2)
T
, . . . , (H0,S)
T
]T
∈ C(SN)×M
gk =
[
(g1,k)
T , (g2,k)
T , . . . , (gS,k)
T
]T ∈ C(SN)×1, ∀k ∈ K.
(1)
The SINR for user k, which is denoted by γk can be computed
by
γk =
(∣∣∣h†d,k + g†kΦH)wk∣∣∣2∑K
j 6=k
∣∣∣(h†d,k + g†kΦH)wj∣∣∣2 + σ2
, (2)
where wk ∈ CM×1 is the transmit beamforming vector for
user k.
The utility function of the BS is given by
U =
K∑
k=1
log2 (1 + γk)− r||Φ||0,2, (3)
where r > 0 is the price to the IRS for providing ||Φ||0,2
reflection modules. Moreover, ||Φ||0,2 , |{s : ||Φs||2 6= 0}| ,
where Φs ∈ CN×N denotes the sth diagonal block of matrix
Φ, s = 1, 2, . . . , S. The ℓ0,2−norm is the number of nonzero
diagonal blocks of Φ. It is possible to replace any sparsity
inducing norm regularization without changing the regulariza-
tion properties of the problem [18]. We will use the convex
ℓ1,2−norm as a group-sparsity inducing regularization to re-
place the non-convex ℓ0,1−norm in (3), and the ℓ1,2−norm is
defined as
||Φ||1,2 ,
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2. (4)
Consequently, the utility function of the BS is expressed as
U =
K∑
k=1
log2(1 + SINRk)− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2, (5)
where balance parameter α > 0. Accordingly, the utility of the
IRS is defined as the revenues received from the BS, shown
as
V = rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2. (6)
B. Stackelberg Game Formulation
Based on the above discussion, the problem can be formu-
lated as a Stackelbeg game, where the IRS is the leader and the
BS is the follower. In a Stackelberg game, the leader selects
its strategy to optimize its utility first and then the follower
move to optimize its utility based on the leader’s startegy. In
particular, here the IRS adjusts the price, r, as the strategy, to
maximize its utility. Thus, the objective of the IRS is to solve
the following problem (L-Problem):
max
r
V = rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2
s.t. r > 0.
(7)
In response to the action of the IRS (leader), the BS (follower)
chooses the best trigger reflection modules, and decides the
passitve beamforming of the selected reflection modules and
the transmit beamforming at the BS. The problem of obtaining
the optimal strategy for the BS (follower) can be formulated
as follows:
F-Problem max
wk,Φ
U =
K∑
k=1
log2(1 + SINRk)− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2
s.t.
K∑
k=1
||wk||22 ≤ pmax
|φi| ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN).
(8)
For the proposed Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg game
equilibrium (SE) is defined as follows.
Definition 1: Define W = [w1,w2, . . . ,wK ] ∈ CM×K .
Let r∗ be a solution of problem (7) and (W∗,Φ∗) be a
solution for problem (8). Then, the point (r∗,W∗,Φ∗) is the
Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed Stackelberg game if
for any (r,W,Φ), the following conditions are satisfied:
U(r∗,W∗,Φ∗) ≥ U(r∗,W,Φ)
V (r∗,W∗,Φ∗) ≥ V (r,W∗,Φ∗). (9)
III. GAME ANALYSIS
In the proposed game, both at the BS’s and the IRS’s side,
since there is only one player, the best response of the BS and
IRS can be readily obtained by solving F-Problem and L-
Problem, respectively. For the proposed game, the SE can be
obtained as follows: For a given r, F-Problem (8) is solved
first. Then, with the obtained best response functions (W ∗,Φ∗)
of the BS, we solve L-Problem (7) for the optimal price r∗.
A. Strategy Analysis for the BS
If we denote the price for serving the BS as r. The follower
problem is
(U0) max
wk,Φ
U =
K∑
k=1
log2(1 + γk)− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2
s.t.
K∑
k=1
||wk||22 ≤ pmax
|φi| ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN).
(10)
To tackle the logarithm in the objective function of (10),
we apply the Lagrangian dual transform. Then, (U0) can be
equivalently written as
max
W,Φ
K∑
k=1
log2 (1 + αk)−
K∑
k=1
αk +
K∑
k=1
(1 + αk)γk
1 + γk
− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2.
(11)
In (11), when W and Φ hold fixed, the optimal αk is
α∗k = γk, ∀k ∈ K. (12)
Then, for a given price r and a fixed {αk}k∈K, optimizing W
and Φ is reduced to
(U0-1) max
W,Φ
K∑
k=1
α˜kγk
1 + γk
− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2, (13)
where α˜k = 1 + αk.
1) Transmit Beamforming: In the following, we investigate
how to find a better beamforming matrix W given fixed Φ for
(13). Denote the combined channel for user k by
h
†
k = h
†
d,k + g
†
kΦH, ∀k ∈ K. (14)
Then, the SINR γk in (2) is given by
γk =
|h†kwk|2∑K
j 6=k |hkwj |2 + σ2
. (15)
Using γk in (15), the objective function of (13) is written as
a function of W :
K∑
k=1
α˜kγk
1 + γk
−rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2 =
K∑
k=1
α˜k|h†kwk|2∑K
j=1 |h†kwj |2 + σ2
− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2.
(16)
Thus, for given r, {αk}k∈K, and Φ, optimizing W becomes
(U1-1)max
W
K∑
k=1
α˜k|h†kwk|2∑K
j=1 |h†kwj |2 + σ2
s.t.
K∑
k=1
||wk||22 ≤ pmax.
(17)
Using quadratic transform, the objective function of (U1-1) is
reformulated as
K∑
k=1
α˜k|h†kwk|2∑K
j=1 |h†kwj |2 + σ2
=
K∑
k=1
2
√
α˜kRe
{
β
‡
kh
†
kwk
}
−
K∑
k=1
|βk|2

 K∑
j=1
|h†kwj |2 + σ2


(18)
where (·)‡ denotes the conjugate. βk ∈ C is the auxiliary
variable. Then, solving problem (U1-1) over W is equiv-
alent to solving the following problem over W and β =
[β1, . . . , βK ]
T ∈ CK×1 :
(U1-2) max
W,β
K∑
k=1
2
√
α˜kRe
{
β
‡
kh
†
kwk
}
−
K∑
k=1
|βk|2

 K∑
j=1
|h†kwj |2 + σ2


s.t.
K∑
k=1
||wk||22 ≤ pmax.
(19)
The optimal βk for a given W is
β∗k =
√
α˜kh
†
kwk∑K
j=1 |h†kwj |2 + σ2
. (20)
Then, fixing β, the optimal wk is
w∗k =
√
α˜kβk

λ0IM + K∑
j=1
|βj |2hjh†j


−1
hk, (21)
where λ0 is the dual variable introduced for the power con-
straint, which is optimally determined by
λ∗0 = max
{
0, pmax −
K∑
k=1
||wk||22
}
. (22)
2) Optimizing Reflection Response Matrix Φ: Optimize Φ
in (U0-1) given fixed pricing r, {αk}k∈K, and W. Using γk
defined in (2), the objective function of (U0-1) is expressed
as a function of Φ:
K∑
k=1
α˜k|(h†d,k + g†kΦ(H))wk|2∑K
j=1 |(h†d,k + g†kΦH)wj |2 + σ2
− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2 (23)
Define aj,k = diag{g†k}Hwj, bj,k = h†d,kwj , ∀k, j =
1, 2, . . . ,K. Combining with the definition of φ, (23) can be
rewritten as
K∑
k=1
α˜k|bk,k +φ†ak,k|2∑K
j=1 |bj,k +φ†aj,k|2 + σ2
− rα
S∑
s=1
||Φs||2 (24)
Note that
∑S
s=1 ||Φs||2 =
∑S
s=1 ||φs||2, optimizing φ can be
represented as follows:
(U2-1) max
φ
K∑
k=1
α˜k|bk,k +φ†ak,k|2∑K
j=1 |bj,k +φ†aj,k|2 + σ2
− rα
S∑
s=1
||φs||2
s.t. φ
†
eie
†
iφ ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN).
(25)
Based on the quadratic transform, the new objective function
of (U2-1) is
K∑
k=1
2
√
α˜kRe
{
ǫ
‡
kφ
†
ak,k + ǫ
‡
kbk,k
}
−
K∑
k=1
|ǫk|2
×

 K∑
j=1
|bj,k +φ†aj,k|2 + σ2

− rα S∑
s=1
||φs||22,
(26)
and ǫ = [ǫ1, . . . , ǫK ]
T ∈ CK×1 refers to the auxiliary variable
vector. Similarly, we optimize φ and ǫ alternatively [11]. The
optimal ǫk for given φ can be obtained easily, shown as
follows:
ǫ∗k =
√
α˜k(bk,k +φ
†
ak,k)∑K
j=1 |bj,k + φ†aj,k|2 + σ2
. (27)
Then, the remaining problem is optimizing φ for given ǫ. By
introducing new variable θ = φ ∈ C(SN)×1. Likewise, θs ∈
CN×1 represents the sth block of vector θ. Thus, for the fixed
ǫ, the optimization problem of φ is given as follows:
(U2-2) max
φ,θ
K∑
k=1
2
√
α˜kRe
{
ǫ
‡
kφ
†
ak,k + ǫ
‡
kbk,k
}
−
K∑
k=1
|ǫk|2
 K∑
j=1
|bj,k +φ†aj,k|2 + σ2

 − rα S∑
s=1
||θs||22
s.t. φ
†
eie
†
iφ ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN)
θ = φ.
(28)
Utilizing the method of augmented Lagrangian minimiza-
tion, (u2-2) can be handled by solving
min
Λ
max
φ,θ
Lc(φ,θ,Λ)
s.t. φ
†
eie
†
iφ ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN),
(29)
φ
∗ =

2 K∑
k=1
|ǫk|2

 K∑
j=1
aj,ka
†
j,k

+ 2 SN∑
i=1
µieie
†
i + cISN


−1
×

2 K∑
k=1
√
α˜kǫ
‡
kak,k +Λ + cθ − 2
K∑
k=1
|ǫk|2
K∑
j=1
bj,kaj,k

 ,
(31)
where c > 0 is the penalty factor; Λ ∈ C(SN)×1 is the
Lagrangian vector multiplier for θ = φ. The partial augmented
Lagrangian function is defined as
Lc(φ,θ,Λ) =
K∑
k=1
2
√
α˜kRe
{
ǫ
‡
kφ
†
ak,k + ǫ
‡
kbk,k
}
−
K∑
k=1
|ǫk|2

 K∑
j=1
|bj,k +φ†aj,k|2 + σ2


− rα
S∑
s=1
||θs||22 − Re
{
Tr
[
Λ†(θ −φ)
]}
− c
2
||θ −φ||22.
(30)
• Updating φ:
By dual theory and KKT conditions, the optimal solution
is given by (31). The Lagrangian multiplier µi updated
by
µ∗i = max
{
0, 1−φ†eie†iφ
}
. (32)
• Updating θ:
The problem of θ is an unconstrained group leastabsolute
selection and shrinkage operator (group Lasso) problem
[19], i.e.,
max
θ
−rα
S∑
s=1
||θs||2−Re
{
Tr
[
Λ†(θ −φ)
]}
− c
2
||θ−φ||22.
(32)
LetΛs ∈ CN×1 denote the sth row block of vector θ, s =
1, 2, . . . , S. Then, (32) can be divided into S independent
problems of θs for s = 1, 2, . . . , S
max
θs
−rα||θs||2−Re
{
Tr
[
Λ†s(θs −φs)
]}
− c
2
||θs−φs||22
(33)
Defining xs = cφs −Λs, and xs − cθs ∈ r∂||θs||2, and
thus, we can easily obtain
θs =
{
0, if ||xs||2 ≤ r
(||xs||2−rα)xs
c||xs||2
, otherwise.
(34)
The update of Lagrangian vector Λs is given by
Λs = Λs + c(θs −φs), ∀s = 1, 2, . . . , S. (35)
B. Game Analysis for the IRS Pricing
Substituting (34) into (L-Problem) in (7), the optimization
problem at the IRS side can be formulated as
max
r>0
S∑
s=1
κs
−r2 + ||xs||2r
c
, (36)
where κs is indicate function, i.e.,
κs =
{
0, if ||xs||2 ≤ r
1, otherwise.
(37)
The optimal solution of (36) is
r∗ =
∑S
s=1 κs||xs||2
2
∑S
s=1 κs
. (38)
The entire framework including the identifying the price and
the trigger module subsets as well as the transmit beamforming
and the phase shift is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm Summary
Step 0: The IRS initialize the price r(1), and set the outer
iteration number τ = 1
Part I: the alternating optimization for solving (U0-1)
(1.1) Initialize W(1) and Φ(1) to feasible values, and set the
iteration number t = 1.
Repeat
(1.2) Update the nominal SINR αk(t), ∀k ∈ K, by (12);
(1.3) Update βk(t), ∀k ∈ K by (20);
(1.4) Update transmit beamforming W(t) by (21); update
λ0(t) by (22)
(1.5) Update ǫk(t), ∀k ∈ K by (27); (1.6) Update φ(t) by (31);
update µi(t), ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , (SN), by (32); (1.7) Update θs(t)
by (34) in parallel for s = 1, 2, . . . S;
(1.8) Update Λs(t) by (35) in parallel for s = 1, 2, . . . , S;
(1.9) Update t = t + 1; (1.10) Until The value of function
(11) converges.
Part II: Update price r by solving problem (36) in the outer
loop
(2.1) Solve problem (36) for given {θs(t)}Ss=1, {Λs(t)}Ss=1,
update r(τ) by (38)
(2.2) Until the utility of the IRS is convergence.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, extensive numerical results are presented to
evaluate the performances of the proposed resource allocation
strategies based on the approach of trigger module pricing.
For simplicity, we set the balance parameter α to be 0.1. The
comparison results between the proposed Stackelberg game-
based ADMM scheme, the random pricing, and direct link
only scheme is presented to demonstrate the higher utility of
the BS and IRS in the proposed scheme. Then the comparative
summary between the Stackelberg game-based ADMM and
some existing schemes are presented. To keep the complexity
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Fig. 1. Impact of the maximum transmit power at the BS on the utility
of the follower, i.e., the BS.
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Fig. 2. Impact of the maximum transmit power at the BS on the utility
of the leader, i.e., the IRS.
of the simulations tractable, we focus on the scenario, where
the K = 4 users are randomly employed within a circle cell
centered at (200, 0) m, and the cell radius is 10 m, the BS and
IRS are employed at (0, 0) m and (200, 50) m, respectively,
where the number of reflection elements of each module is
set as N = 8. We assume that the BS is equipped with 4
antennas. We assume quasi-static block fading channels, i.e.,
the channels from the BS to the IRS and the IRS to the
users remain constant during each time block, but may vary
from one to another [20]. To include the effects of fading and
shadowing, we use the path-loss model introduced in [21].
The performance of the Stackelberg game-based ADMM
scheme is evaluated against two existing benchmark schemes,
i.e., random pricing scheme and direct link only scheme in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. In the random pricing scheme, the IRS
randomly determines its strategies, without considering the
existence of the BS. The direct link only scheme means no
IRS to aid, i.e., no module is triggered at IRS. Fig. 1 and Fig.
2 respectively show the effect of the maximum transmit power
Pmax on the utility of the BS and the IRS, when the number
of reflection modules is 6. For the BS and IRS, the Stackelberg
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Fig. 3. Impact of the number of reflection modules of the IRS on
the utility of the follower, i.e., the BS, when each module consisting 8
reflection elements.
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Fig. 4. Impact of the number of reflection modules of the IRS on
the utility of the leader, i.e., the IRS, when each module consisting 8
reflection elements.
game-based ADMM scheme achieves the highest utility value
compared with random pricing and direct link schemes, which
indicates that the proposed pricing-based Stackelberg game
scheme performs best in resource allocation for IRS-aided
communications. From the results, we observe that the utility
values of the BS increases as pmax grows from −5 dBm to
5 dBm. Meanwhile, the utility value of the IRS achieved by
the Stackelberg game-based ADMM scheme first decreases
slowly until the maximum transmit power increases to 0 dBm
and then decreases rapidly by increasing the value of pmax.
This is because that the cost of power consumption is not
considered in the utility of the BS, and thereby, the BS will
tend to select a small number of reflection modules when the
transmit power is sufficient.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate how the number of reflection
modules S affects the utility values of the BS and IRS, respec-
tively, when the maximum transmit power pmax = 0dBm. The
IRS’s utility values in the Stackelberg game scheme and the
random pricing scheme increase as the number of reflection
modules grows from S = 4 to S = 7. This is due to the
fact that the IRS operator incentivizes the BS to trigger more
reflection modules by appropriately adjusting pricing strate-
gies. Consequently, the utility values of the BS decrease as the
number of reflection modules, S, increases. Most importantly,
Figs. 1–4 show that the proposed Stackelberg game-based
ADMM scheme outperforms the other two schemes in pricing-
based resource allocation.
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption of an IRS for downlink multi-user communi-
cation from a multi-antenna BS was investigated in this paper.
Specifically, we developed a Stackelbeg game approach to
analyze the interaction between the BS and the IRS operator
considering that the IRS operator may be selfish or has its
own objectives. Different from the existing studies on IRS
that merely focused on tuning the reflection coefficient of all
the reflection elements, we considered the reflection resource
(elements) management, which can be realized via trigger
module selection under our proposed IRS architecture that all
the reflection elements are partially controlled by independent
switches of controller. A Stackelberg game-based ADMM was
proposed to solve either the transmit beamforming at the BS or
the passive beamorming of the triggered reflection modules.
Numerical examples were presented to verify the proposed
studies. It was shown that the proposed scheme is effective in
the utilities of both the BS and IRS.
REFERENCES
[1] Q. Wu and R. Zhang, “Beamforming optimization for wireless network
aided by intelligent reflecting surface with discrete phase shifts,” pp. 1–
30, June 2019.
[2] C. Huang, A. Zappone, G. C. Alexandropoulos, M. Debbah, and
C. Yuen, “Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces for energy efficiency in
wireless communication,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, vol. 18, pp. 4157–4170, August.
[3] E. Basar, M. D. Renzo, J. D. Rosny, M. Debbah, M. S. Alouini, and
R. Zhang, “Wireless communications through reconfigurable intelligent
surfaces,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 116753–116773, 2019.
[4] M. D. Renzo, M. Debbah, D. T. Phan-Huy, and A. Zapppone, “Smart
radio environments empowered by reconfigurable AI meta-surfaces: an
idea whose time has come,” Eurasip Journal on Wireless Communica-
tions and Networking, pp. 1–32, May 2019.
[5] E. Basar, M. D. Renzo, J. D. Rosny, M. Debbah, M. Alouini, and
R. Zhang, “Wireless communications through reconfigurable intelligent
surfaces,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 116753–116773, August 2019.
[6] J. Hu, H. Zhang, B. Di, L. Li, L. Song, Y. Li, Z. Han,
and H. V. Poor, “Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces based
rf sensing: design, optimization, and implementation.”
https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2019arXiv191209198H/abstract,
2019. Online.
[7] Q. Wu and R. Zhang, “Towards smart and reconfigurable environment:
intellignet reflecting surfaces aided wireless network,” 2019.
[8] Y. Han, W. Tang, S. Jin, C. Wen, and X. Ma, “Large intelligent
surfaceassisted wireless communication exploiting statistical CSI,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 68, no. 8, pp. 8238–8242, 2019.
[9] Y. Gao, C. Yong, Z. H. Xiong, D. Niyato, and Y. Xiao, “Reflection
resource management for intelligent reflecting surface aided wireless
networks.” https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.00331, 2020. Online.
[10] Q. Wu and R. Zhang, “Intelligent reflecting surface enhanced wireless
network via joint active and passive beamforming design,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Wireless Communications, August 2019.
[11] H. Guo, Y. C. Liang, J. Chen, and E. G. Larsson, “Weighted sum-
rate optimization for intelligent reflecting surface enhanced wireless
networks,” 2019.
[12] C. Pan, H. Ren, K. Wang, M. Elkashlan, A. Nallanathan, J. Wnag, and
L. Hanzo, “Intelligent reflecting surface aided mimo broadcasting for
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer,” 2019.
[13] E. Bjornson, O. Ozdogan, and E. G. Larsson, “Intelligent reflecting
surface vs. decode-and-forward: How large surfaces are needed to beat
relaying?,” pp. 1–5, August 2019.
[14] K. Ntontin, M. D. Renzo, J. Song, F. Lazarakis, J. D. Rosny, D.-T.
Phan-Huy, O. Simeone, R. Zhang, M. Debbah, G. Lerosey, M. Fink,
S. Tretyakov, and S. Shamai, “Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces
vs. relaying: Differences, similarities, and performance comparison.”
https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08747, 2019. Online.
[15] F. Liu, O. Tsilipakos, A. Pitilakis, A. C. Tasolamprou, M. S. Mirmoosa,
N. V. Kantartzis, and et. al., “Intelligent metasurfaces with continuously
tunable local surface impedance for multiple reconfigurable functions,”
Physical Review Applied, vol. 11, pp. 044024–1–044024–1, April 2019.
[16] X. Tan, Z. Sun, D. Koutsonikolas, and J. M. Jornet, “Enabling indoor
mobile millimeter-wave networks based on smart reflect-arrays,” in 2018
IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, (Honolulu, HI, USA),
pp. 1–9, April 2018.
[17] L. Li, C. T. Jun, W. Ji, S. Liu, J. Ding, X. Wan, L. Y. Bo,
M. Jiang, C. Qiu, and S. Zhang, “Electromagnetic reprogrammable
coding-metasurface holograms,” Nature Communications, vol. 8, pp. 1–
7, August 2017.
[18] O. Mehanna, N. D. Sidiropoulos, and G. B. Giannakis, “Joint multicast
beamforming and antenna selection,” IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, vol. 61, pp. 2660–2674, May 2013.
[19] M. Yuan and Y. Lin, “Model selection and estimation in regression with
grouped variables,” Journal Royal Statistical Society, vol. 68, pp. 49–67,
December 2006.
[20] Z. Yang and M. Dong, “Low-complexity coordinated relay beamforming
design for multi-cluster relay interference networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 2215–2228, 2019.
[21] Y. Gao, Y. Xiao, M. Wu, M. Xiao, and J. Shao, “Dynamic social-aware
peer selection for cooperative relay management with d2d communica-
tions,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 67, pp. 3124–3139,
May 2019.
